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Abstract—Cryptocurrency exchanges are frequently targeted
and compromised by cyber-attacks, which may lead to sig-
nificant losses for the depositors and closure of the affected
exchanges. These risks threaten the viability of the entire public
blockchain ecosystem since exchanges serve as major gateways
for participation in public blockchain technologies.
In this paper, we develop an economic model to capture
the short-term incentives of cryptocurrency exchanges with
respect to making security investments and establishing trans-
action fees. Using the model, we derive conclusions regarding
an exchange’s optimal economic decisions, and illustrate key
features of these conclusions using graphs based on real-world
data. Our security investment model exhibits horizontal scaling
properties with respect to reducing exposure to losses, and may
be of special interest to exchanges operating in markets with
high price volatility.
1. Introduction
Public blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies are
inherently linked together. The value of a public blockchain
protocol gives value to those tokens which facilitate partic-
ipation in the protocol. Conversely, if the tokens required
to use a blockchain protocol are difficult to monetize, the
technology may lose value, or in extreme cases, may cease
to function at all. This connection highlights the importance
of cryptocurrency exchanges to the blockchain ecosystem.
Since the inception of Bitcoin in 2008, blockchain tech-
nologies and their associated cryptocurrencies have been on
a spectacular (but volatile) path to success [28]. Bitcoin in
particular, and blockchain technologies more generally, have
fundamentally changed how users, businesses and financial
intermediaries, as well as governments perceive the notion
of virtual currencies [11].
Compared to traditional currencies issued by govern-
ments, virtual currencies are less regulated; their issuing
technologies are generally controlled by programmers and
math, rather than state agents; and their base of use and ac-
ceptance is still primarily a self-selected group of users and
organizations. However, despite a bottom-up development
approach, the practical constraints of sustaining a cryptocur-
rency ecosystem have fostered the creation of a number of
entities, such as mining pools, in which individual miners
self-organize to smooth the financial risk of individualized
mining operations.
Similarly, a global and diverse ecosystem of cryptocur-
rency exchanges has grown into existence. On these third-
party intermediaries, users can trade cryptocurrency for real
money (or vice versa) or other cryptocurrencies [1]. As
such, exchanges facilitate inter-network transactions, but
can also serve as a platform for financial speculation and
arbitrage [16], [21]. In addition, exchanges serve as major
gateways to the blockchain ecosystem. In fact, the purchase
of any cryptocurrency coins on an exchange is often the
first participatory step for consumers interested in joining
the blockchain ecosystem.
At the time of writing, the top 5 exchanges cover
over 50% of the overall market share and trade a sizable
number of cryptocurrencies; however, the entire cryptocur-
rency ecosystem consists of well over 50 exchanges with
considerable variation in supported currencies and trading
volume. Partly, this diversity can be explained by jurisdic-
tional boundaries and the convenience to operate in a local
currency. At the same time, market efficiency considerations
would perhaps suggest an even higher degree of concentra-
tion than what is observed in practice.
In particular, we observe that a higher level of concentra-
tion is under threat due to security issues. Because of their
central role and currency-holding function, exchanges are a
major target for insider fraud and external security compro-
mises, which may lead to significant losses for the depositors
and closure of the affected exchanges. For a three-year
period ending in January 2013, Moore and Christin observed
a 45% closure rate for exchanges [27]. A follow-up study
extending into 2015 calculated an overall exchange failure
rate of 48% [26].
One of the most frequently cited examples of cryptocur-
rency exchange failures is the alleged case of fraudulent
withdrawals from the Mt. Gox exchange, which led to its
eventual bankruptcy and ongoing legal action. At its peak,
Mt. Gox was facilitating over 70% of all Bitcoin transac-
tions. But Mt. Gox is not an isolated incident. More recently,
in 2016, the Bitfinex exchange suffered a security breach
that resulted in 119,756 bitcoins, which were worth around
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$70 million at the time, being stolen from user accounts
on the exchange [30]. Bitfinex eventually reimbursed the
affected users, reinforcing their trust in the exchange, and it
remains one of the largest exchanges in operation.
Such observations motivate our objective for this pa-
per: to better understand the trade-offs between financial
aspects of running a cryptocurrency exchange and potential
investments in security. To address this goal, we investigate
the market for cryptocurrency exchanges from an economic
perspective. In particular, we develop an economic model
for studying the day-to-day business incentives of an up-
and-coming cryptocurrency exchange.
After motivating the tradeoffs of the model with respect
to security investments and transaction fee rates, we conduct
a decision analysis to determine an exchange’s optimal
choices in terms of a fixed set of parameters. We then
motivate specific values of those parameters using pub-
licly available data involving cryptocurrency markets, and
produce a set of illustrations for the optimal investments
predicted by our analyses.
Finally, we discuss the recent market volatility in the
price of various cryptocurrencies and its implications for the
business operations of cryptocurrency exchanges. In partic-
ular, the optimal strategy for distributing loss exposure that
arises from security investments within our model represents
a form of horizontal scaling. We believe that implementing
such a strategy could help cryptocurrency exchanges to
make security investments at a rate that matches their fast-
paced operating conditions, taking market price volatility
into consideration.
Understanding incentive misalignments in the market of
cryptocurrency exchanges is of critical importance for the
current and future viability of public blockchain ecosystems.
Consumers need to be able to rely on the availability and
safety of their deposited assets, but at the same time a
diverse system of exchanges can support goals, such as di-
versification and specialization. We expect that our research
contributes to a critical debate on optimal market structure
and realistic security expectations.
Roadmap: In Section 2, we provide an overview of
related work about cryptocurrency exchanges and economic
analyses of cryptocurrency markets. In Section 3, we discuss
the incentives that exchanges face in order to motivate
our economic model, which is presented in Section 4. We
conduct a decision analysis of our model in Section 5,
and present numerical results in Section 6. In Section 7,
we discuss the implications of distributed loss exposure
strategies specific to cryptocurrency exchanges. Finally, we
offer concluding remarks in Section 8.
2. Related Work
A growing number of comprehensive review and
overview articles address Bitcoin, and cryptocurrencies in
general [4], [5]. Likewise, our work is relevant to the
broader field of the economics of security (e.g., [23]). In
our discussion of related work, we focus on the functional,
financial, and security aspects of cryptocurrency exchanges,
and on economic models of virtual currencies.
2.1. Research on Cryptocurrency Exchanges
Most closely related to our work, Moore and Christin
study factors for success and failure of Bitcoin exchanges
with a three-year dataset ending in January 2013 [27]. They
discuss the reasons behind the observed 45% closure rate,
including security breaches. Statistical analysis suggests that
more popular exchanges are attacked more often, but small
exchanges are overall more likely to shut down. A more
recent follow-up study provides a more detailed longitudinal
analysis on newer data while confirming the same overall
message [26].
Gandal et al. used data from the Mt. Gox Bitcoin cur-
rency exchange and determined how a single entity was able
to manipulate prices in a highly significant fashion [15].
Feder et al. also used Mt. Gox data to understand the impact
of a DDoS attack on trade volume and the frequency of large
trades [13].
A critical aspect of the viability of cryptocurrency ex-
changes is to limit the risk of bankruptcy or insider fraud.
One mitigating factor is proof of solvency, which signals
that deposits are correctly accounted for. This line of work
includes Decker et al., who propose to use Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM), a secure cryptographic co-processor,
to prove solvency [9]. Dagher et al. introduce Provisions,
a privacy-preserving proof of solvency [8]. This approach
camouflages the total assets and liabilities associated with an
exchange, while proving that assets are strictly greater than
the accumulated liabilities. Jain et al. study the optimization
problem faced by exchanges when they have to decide
how much of their holdings to keep in online storage to
serve demands quickly, or to keep reserves offline (i.e., in
comparatively safer cold storage) [18].
Cryptocurrency exchanges have also been a fruitful
ground for empirical finance studies. Gandal and Halaburda
as well as Pieters and Vivanco examine exchange rates
and arbitrage opportunities related to Bitcoin exchanges
[14], [29]. Glaser et al. investigate Bitcoin transaction and
network volume as well as price formation with a particular
focus on understanding intra-network transactions and on-
exchange trading. Their analysis suggests that less informed
(new) consumers are likely to hold on to bitcoins as an
investment rather than using it for intra-network transaction
purposes [16]. Likewise, Kristoufek studies to which degree
Bitcoin represents a speculative or conventional monetary
asset [21]. Bitcoin price formation has also been studied by
Brandvold et al. [6].
Despite the growing depth and diversity of research
related to cryptocurrency exchanges, to the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first to attempt modeling the
incentives of cryptocurrency exchanges for security invest-
ments.
2.2. Economic Models of Virtual Currencies
Johnson et al. and Laszka et al. study the competitive
(and at times adversarial interaction) of Bitcoin mining pools
with different modeling approaches [19], [24]. They find
that more sizable mining pools are more often victims of
Distributed Denial of Service attacks, but are also more
often the instigators. They also study the long-term impact
of such attacks. Addressing a similar problem, Kroll et al.
investigate the stability of mining on a public blockchain if
an outsider has motivation to destroy the associated currency
[22]. More specifically, their “Goldfinger” attack compares
on a high level the collective benefit of Bitcoin mining
with some externally given incentive to destroy the economy
altogether.
Eyal and Sirer analyze to which degree Bitcoin may
be manipulable by a colluding group of miners [12]. Houy
provides a complementary analysis showing that not only
proof-of-work transaction validation, but also proof-of-stake
validation is vulnerable [17]. Rather than assuming adver-
sarial competition, Lewenberg et al. study how earnings of
mining pools can be fairly distributed from a cooperative
perspective and highlight problematic parameter constella-
tions [25].
To the best of our knowledge, studies of the trade-
off between financial aspects of running a cryptocurrency
exchange and security investments are currently unavailable.
We address this literature gap with our work.
3. Incentives of Exchanges and Users
3.1. Incentives of Exchanges
Exchanges want to maximize profits, and at the very
least, stay in business. To reach these goals, they need to
achieve a certain level of transaction volume while main-
taining sufficient operational security.
A cryptocurrency exchange is a two-sided market. Ex-
changes match sellers with buyers, and to be successful, an
exchange should be attractive to both. For sellers, higher
transaction volumes and liquidity are important, since they
help ensure quick sales at fair market prices. Security is
also paramount since the cryptocurrency is transferred to and
stored on the exchange before selling to a buyer. For buyers,
competitive transaction fees are crucial, but so is offering an
easy way to transfer local currency into the cryptocurrency
sold on the exchange. Given differing regulations across
countries, some exchanges have specialized in serving cer-
tain markets. For example, at the time of this writing, the
two leading exchanges converting between BTC and USD
are Bitfinex and GDAX, both of which only accept USD
as input. In addition to the difficulties of complying with
local laws, such geographic dominance may also reflect the
network effects of matching buyers and sellers of the same
currency on particular platforms.
Like all two-sided markets, cryptocurrency exchanges
exhibit positive externalities. This means that the value of
an exchange grows as more users participate. In this case,
having more users translates to higher transaction volumes,
which makes the exchange more attractive to both buyers
and sellers. Higher volume can also lead to higher revenue
if the transaction fees are held constant, or lower transaction
fees if the savings are passed on to customers.
Investing in security serves multiple purposes. Naturally,
it protects against breaches, which are notoriously com-
mon amongst exchanges. Since there is usually very little
recourse for exchanges after an attack, suffering a breach
can deal a devastating blow. Prior work has established that
transaction volume is positively correlated with experiencing
a breach [27], which makes sense because more success-
ful exchanges present more valuable targets for attackers.
Consequently, the need for security investment grows as an
exchange becomes more popular.
However, the aforementioned study also showed that low
transaction volume can present an existential threat to the
exchanges as well. When smaller exchanges are attacked,
they are less likely to be able to recover, and may be
forced to shut down. For example, the low-volume Polish
exchange Bitmarket.eu operated for nearly 18 months, but
closed following a breach and did not appear to reimburse
customers.
3.2. Incentives of Users
Security can also be used as a differentiating feature
to attract customers. Many exchanges offer two-factor au-
thentication features to customers, for example. Some, such
as Kraken [20], publicize the fact that they have under-
gone security audits, and many advertise that they store
large amounts of reserves in cold storage. Note that while
it is easy for customers to verify the amount stored in
cold wallets, the guarantee is not absolute: exchanges may
mistakenly expose their cold wallets on vulnerable com-
puters or even lose the private key associated with the
wallet. However, the point of these actions may be less
about improving the exchange’s actual security and more
about strengthening the perceived security of the exchange.
Prospective customers are naturally concerned about the
security of any deposits kept at exchanges, given multiple
past examples where the customers of failed exchanges
have lost money. Public displays of security investments
can reassure customers and encourage would-be attackers
to seek easier targets.
This discussion highlights the importance of customer
interests and preferences to which successful exchanges
must cater. In addition to security, several other factors
influence customer choice among exchanges. One key factor
is the transaction fee charged. Frequent traders are more
likely to be sensitive to transaction fees. Exchanges make
direct comparisons on fees difficult—some offer flat fees
while others create a schedule that favors frequent traders
or rewards loyal customers. For example, Bitstamp’s fees
start at 0.25% for traders whose monthly volume is less
than $20,000, dropping to 0.10% for volumes exceeding
$20M. These techniques are designed to encourage customer
“stickiness.”
Also important is the ease with which a given cryptocur-
rency can be purchased using external currencies. This can
vary greatly by country, by cryptocurrency, and by exchange.
While nearly all exchanges accept wire transfers, these are
seen as inconvenient and expensive. A few exchanges, such
as Coinbase and Circle in the United States, do accept credit
cards, but the associated fees may discourage casual users.
Regulatory actions sometimes get in the way, however.
For example, following its hack, US-based correspondent
banks began blocking international USD wire transfers to
Bitfinex [2].
4. Economic Model
4.1. Overview
In the previous section, we discussed a range of in-
centives that influence the decisions of users in selecting
exchanges, as well as the options for differentiation among
exchanges. We now translate these high-level incentives into
a simplified analytical model, designed to capture the day-
to-day business incentives of a cryptocurrency exchange.
Our model focuses on two decisions made by the operators
of an exchange: the investment in security measures to
reduce its exposure to loss, and the choice of transaction
fees on trades to generate revenue. Table 1 lists the symbols
used in our model.
TABLE 1: List of Symbols
Symbol Description
Functions and Parameters
P (t) profit on day t
R(t) revenue on day t
C(t) costs on day t
CB(t) business expenses on day t
CR(t) business risk on day t
V (t) total volume of trades occurring within the exchange on day t
p(t) probability that an incident happens on day t
L(t) loss that will occur in case an incident happens on day t
αM attack-probability constant
βM risk-exposure constant
γBS fraction of users who are willing to leave an established
exchange for a lower transaction fee
Choice Variables
f fee rate
I(t) security investment
4.2. Profit
A cryptocurrency exchange is an online business that
allows its users to make two-party trades involving two
different types of currencies, at least one of which is a
cryptocurrency. As a business, their day-to-day operational
decisions revolve around the notion of profit. We define the
daily profit P (t) of an exchange to be the difference between
its daily revenue R(t) and its daily costs C(t).
P (t) = R(t)− C(t). (1)
4.2.1. Revenue. To keep the revenue model simple but
realistic, we focus on the most common and typically largest
source of revenue for exchanges, which is a transaction fee
on trades, assessed as a percentage of the volume of the
trade. For our modeling purposes, suppose that fee rate f is
some constant percentage rate1 (for example, 20 basis points
or 0.2%), and let V (t) denote the total volume of all trades
within the exchange occurring during day t (expressed in
the resolving currency of the exchange, e.g., USD). Then,
the exchange’s daily business revenue R(t) is given by
R(t) = f · V (t). (2)
4.2.2. Costs. In our model, we divide costs into business
expenses CB and business risks CR. Business risks repre-
sent losses that might occur due to incidents. The daily costs
may thus be expressed simply as
C(t) = CB(t) + CR(t). (3)
4.2.3. Security Investments. An exchange incurs a variety
of business expenses, all of which may be important if we
consider the long-term strategies of an exchange to maintain
liquidity and stay in business. However, our approach here
only considers short-term operational decisions involving
security, which may be considered as just a subset of an
exchange’s real decision-making requirements. In particular,
our decision model is focused entirely on security and fees,
and so the present cost model considers only the cost I(t)
of investing in security.
CB(t) = I(t). (4)
The purpose of security investments is to reduce the risk
or the exposure to potential loss from incidents, such as
security breaches and insider attacks.
4.2.4. Business Risks. Operating an exchange is a risky
business. For example, hackers may compromise parts of
the exchange software that allows them to steal user funds
and/or business liquidity. Rogue employees may also steal
funds to similar effect. In our model, the risk-related cost
for day t is a product of two random variables 1p(t) · L(t),
where p(t) is the probability that an incident happens on day
t, 1p(t) is a Bernoulli random variable indicating whether or
not the incident actually happens on day t, and L(t) is the
loss that will occur in case an incident happens. Hence,
CR(t) = 1p(t) · L(t). (5)
4.2.5. Summary. Putting everything together, the profit of
an exchange on day t may be expressed as
P (t) = f · V (t)− I(t)− 1p(t) · L(t), (6)
where the choice variables for an exchange are the fee rate
f and the daily security investment I(t).
1. In practice, the fee rate often depends on the amount of currency
being offered or asked, the type of transaction (e.g., limit order or market
order), etc. Our model abstracts away from the details of fee structures, and
focuses on fee rates for average users in comparison with other exchanges.
In the following subsections, we provide additional
structure to the model, by constraining the relationships
between security investment and expected outcomes, and
between fee levels and volume. Because our analysis focuses
on day-to-day incentives for exchanges, we will sometimes
omit the time variable t.
4.3. Risk Valuation
The daily risks of an exchange may be considered along
two dimensions: probabilities and exposure. What is the
likelihood that an exchange gets breached on a particular
day? And what is the potential loss if it does get breached
on a given day? Our model will consider these concerns
separately.
4.3.1. Probability of Attack. The economic approach to
predicting events such as being hacked on the Internet,
whose probabilities are difficult to measure, is based on
the assumption that attackers are incentivized to attack the
most valuable targets. A complementary extension of that
principle, which we apply to our model, says that the
probability of an exchange being breached is proportional
to the volume of the exchange.
There is practical evidence suggesting that this is indeed
true. Research on exchange closures has shown a strong
positive correlation between the volume of an exchange and
whether that exchange experiences a security incident [27].
Our model will assume that the probability of an ex-
change being attacked is proportional to the relative volume
of the exchange within the given market. An exchange hav-
ing a larger share of the market will receive more attention
and face greater risks. Let M be an exchange market (i.e., a
pair of currencies to be exchanged); let VM denote the total
volume of this market, and let V denote the volume of a
specific exchange participating in M . Our assumption says
that
p ∼ V
VM
.
Finally, we let αM denote the constant of proportion-
ality. The constant αM depends on the market M , and we
can estimate it by considering historical breach data (see
Section 6.2). In sum, our constraining assumption gives
p =
αM · V
VM
. (7)
4.3.2. Exposure to Loss. The minimum exposure of an
exchange throughout a given day is the amount of currency
that is necessary to fulfill the trades on that day. Even
though it is possible to move assets to more secure storage
locations (e.g., cold storage), some of the funds need to
be accessible through the Internet for liquidity, and thus be
exposed to the highest levels of risk. In the best case, the
loss exposure of an exchange on a given day is proportional
to its daily volume. However, it may be much worse. If the
exchange has poor security or exposes more of its assets than
necessary, a breach could have a more catastrophic impact.
Suppose that some amount of security investment I∗ is
sufficient for reducing the loss exposure to exactly the daily
volume of the exchange. Our model treats I as the entire
costs of operating the exchange, so let us consider a some-
what hypothetical question. How much could the exchange
reduce its loss exposure by doubling its investment to 2 ·I∗?
By approximately doubling its entire operating cost, it could
funnel half of its volume through a completely independent
exchange system. Then, each of these two exchange systems
would expose exactly half the daily volume compared to
before. The same logic applies to tripling the investment, and
so on. Consequently, we can assume that the loss exposure
of an exchange is proportional to its daily volume divided
by its security investment. That is,
L ∼ V
I
.
We let βM denote the constant of proportionality. This
constant also depends on the market M , and we will es-
timate it by considering the price of white-label exchange
software (see Section 6.2). In sum,
L =
βM · V
I
. (8)
Note that this security investment mechanism for dis-
tributing loss exposure exhibits the properties of horizontal
scaling, similar to how additional web servers may be added
to handle traffic congestion.
4.4. Fees and Volume
There is an inverse relationship between transaction
fees and transaction volume, at least according to classical
economic theory, which says that if the price of a product or
service rises, fewer people will purchase it. Unfortunately,
beyond that basic principle it is difficult to imagine the
smooth equilibrium results of prices in competition to hold
in regimes in which the economic fundamentals are as
volatile as the exchange prices of today’s cryptocurrencies.
Therefore, we are forced to take a somewhat less
calculus-oriented approach to considering how, say, an in-
coming (initially small) cryptocurrency exchange S would
choose a value for its transaction fee fS . Suppose that for
a given market M , there is a large dominant exchange B,
which charges a transaction fee level fB . Since B is well-
funded, feature-rich, and heavily marketed, it seems unlikely
for a new exchange to attract any substantial market share
whatsoever if they start with a fee level higher than that of
B. So the choices for S can reasonably be restricted to lie
in the interval [0, fB ].
Now consider also that in today’s market, sophisticated
users are likely to be more concerned about price volatility
than they are about transaction fees. After all, if we look
at the daily statistics from a variety of cryptocurrency ex-
changes, we see daily variations in the prices reaching up
to 10% of the total price of the currency being traded. This
variation is almost two orders of magnitude greater than
the typical transaction fees that are assessed on trades. So
the risk of participating in a low volume exchange would
seem to dominate the small variation in transaction fee levels
between exchanges.
Therefore, we may safely assume that there is only a
small fraction of the users (say γBS) that are willing to
leave an established exchange B for a smaller exchange S
only on the basis of having a lower transaction fee. For the
sake of concreteness, let us assume that this small set of
users are distributed uniformly in their sensitivity to fees,
so that the volume of S increases linearly from 0 to γBSVB
as fS decreases from fB to zero. This assumption yields
VS =
γBS · VB · (fB − fS)
fB
. (9)
By using this equation, we may calculate the anticipated
volume VS of a new exchange in terms of its own fee level
fS , the fee level of the big exchange fB , the volume of the
big exchange VB , and the parameter γBS .
5. Decision Analysis
5.1. Overview
In this section, we analyze the model, presented in the
previous section, to calculate the security investments and
fee levels that maximize an exchange’s daily profit as a
function of the environmental parameters.
Recall that the daily profit of an exchange was given in
Equation 6 by
P (t) = f · V (t)− I(t)− 1p(t) · L(t). (10)
Because we will focus on the day-to-day optimization,
we can omit the variable t and avoid the nondeterministic
nature of the formula by evaluating the expected daily profit
E[P ]. To do this, we replace the random variable 1p ·L with
its expected value pL.
Putting it all together, our goal is to maximize the
expected daily profit of the exchange, which is
E[P ] = f · V − I − p · L. (11)
5.2. Optimizing Security Investments
We can optimize the investment levels for expected profit
by expanding the terms of Equation 11 and using calculus.
Expanding those terms we have
E[P ] = f · V − I − p · L
= f · V − I − αM · V
VM
· βM · V
I
.
To find the optimum investment level, calculate the first
derivative of profit with respect to security investment and
set it equal to zero.
∂E[P ]
∂I
= −1 + αM · βM · V
2
VM · I2 = 0
I2 =
αM · βM · V 2
VM
I = V
√
αM · βM
VM
.
We see that the optimal investment in distributed security
is a proportion of the exchange’s daily volume. The pro-
portion itself depends on the volume in the entire market,
as well as the parameters describing the market’s overall
riskiness, and the cost of distributing exposure to losses.
By adopting this level of investment, the expected profit
of an exchange becomes
E[P ] = f · V − I − αM · V
VM
· βM · V
I
= f · V − V
√
αM · βM
VM
− V
√
αM · βM
VM
= V
(
f − 2
√
αM · βM
VM
)
.
5.3. Optimizing Fee Levels
In order to maximize revenue from the fee, an exchange
S should choose its fee level fS to maximize the portion
of profit which it affects. We will compute this in two
ways, both of which may be well-motivated in some cir-
cumstances.
First, we compute the optimal fee level by ignoring
the effects of security investment. The rationale for this
approach is that, when using real-world values for the
parameters αM , βM and VM , the magnitude of the side
effect is very small compared to the typical market value
for transaction fees, hence the effect of considering security
is only noise on the approximate optimal value of the fee
level.
To implement this approach, we simply approximate
∂E[P ]
∂f by
∂fV
∂f , substitute for V using Equation 9, and set
the result equal to zero. Doing this, we obtain
∂(fSVS)
∂fS
=
∂
∂fS
(
fS · γBS · VB · (fB − fS)
fB
)
0 =
γBS · VB · (fB − 2 · fS)
fB
fS =
fB
2
.
We see that in this case, the exchange’s optimal fee rate is
exactly half the rate set by the bigger exchange.
Secondly, we compute the optimal fee value while con-
sidering the side effects of security investment. This will
help us to see how the dynamic might evolve for exchange
markets in which either there is abnormally high risk, or
in which the cost of operations is large compared to the
total volume of the market. To implement this approach, we
put all of our equations together, and follow the strategy
described above.
E[P ] = VS
(
fS − 2
√
αM · βM
VM
)
=
γBS · VB · (fB − fS)
fB
(
fS − 2
√
αM · βM
VM
)
∂E[P ]
∂fS
=
γBSVB
fB
(
fB + 2
√
αM · βM
VM
− 2fS
)
= 0
fS =
fB
2
+
√
αM · βM
VM
.
Again in this case, we see that the optimal fee rate for
exchange S is similar to half the big exchange’s rate, but
here it should be slightly higher to account for the additional
risk that comes with increased revenue. This additional risk
essentially creates a drag on the effectiveness of the fee rate
with respect to profit generation, so that the optimum profit
level is not reached until there is a slightly higher fee rate.
6. Numerical Analysis
6.1. Overview
In this section, we give values to the various parameters
by using real world data involving market volumes, the
relative sizes of big and small exchanges, and the historical
probabilities of exchanges being breached. We interpret the
results in terms of these figures, and provide numerical
illustrations for the conclusions of our analyses.
6.2. Parameter Estimations
The values for the parameters involving total market
volume VM , volume of the big exchange VB , and fee level
of the big exchange fB were estimated based on publicly-
available data on exchange volumes for the Bitcoin econ-
omy [3], using BitFinex as an example of a big exchange.
These estimates are VM = $600M, VB = $200M, and
fB = 0.002, respectively.
The fraction of users willing to leave a big exchange B
for a smaller exchange S based on fee levels, γBS , was
estimated at 0.01 based on the fact that a median Bitcoin
exchange by volume exchanges somewhat less than 1% of
the total market volume.
The parameter αM measures the probability of a suc-
cessful attack against one of the exchanges in a market on a
given day. Based on data for Bitcoin exchange attacks, from
the aforementioned study by Moore and Christin [27], which
reported 27 different exchanges that experienced a breach
during a period of some 1918 days. This event space yields
an average daily probability of breach of roughly 1.4%.
Lastly, the parameter βM is the unit cost of operating
an additional risk-independent cryptocurrency exchange. We
estimated this parameter by aggregating publicly-available
pricing information for various managed solutions providing
“white label” exchange software. For example, Draglet [10]
offers a fully managed exchange software for around US
$75K per year. Meanwhile, BTC Trader [7] offers what
seems to be a similar product requiring an initial license
fee of US $25K and 30% of the transaction fees, with
a minimum fee of US $10K per month. Averaging the
(minimum) costs of these products, amortizing the flat fees
over the course of one year, and expressing the result in
units of dollars per day, yields an estimate for βM of
approximately $300.
6.3. Security Investment and Risks
Figure 1 shows the optimal security investment IS as
a function of the attack-probability constant αM and the
risk-exposure constant βM . The fee level was also op-
timized based on the optimal security investment, to be
fB/2 +
√
αM · βM/VM . As expected, both higher attack
probabilities and potential losses incentivize the exchange
to invest more in security in order to mitigate the higher
risk. However, if either one of these factors is very low,
then security risks are manageable even without significant
investments.
Figure 1: Optimal security investment IS as a function
of attack-probability constant αM and risk-exposure con-
stant βM . Here, VM = 600M, VB = 200M, fB = 0.002,
γBS = 0.01, and fS is the optimal fee rate.
6.4. Daily Profit and Choices
Figure 2 shows the exchange’s daily profit as a function
of its fee rate fS and security investment IS . The optimal
fee rate and security investment are fS = 0.108% and
IS = $69.0. Either increasing or decreasing the fee from this
optimal level will gradually decrease the exchange’s profit,
either due to becoming not competitive in the market or
Figure 2: Profit PS as a function of fee rate fS and security
investment IS . Parameter values are VM = 600M, VB =
200M, fB = 0.002, γBS = 0.01, αM = 0.014 and βM =
300.
due to being insufficient to collect significant revenue. De-
creasing security investments results in a rapid decrease in
profitability due to the rapid increase in security risks. How-
ever, increasing security investments decreases profitability
slowly due to the slowly increasing business expenses. This
suggests that rational exchanges should not shirk security
investments when they are uncertain about the optimal level.
6.5. Security Investment and the Market
Figure 3 shows the optimal security investment IS as a
function of the total market size VM and the fraction of fee-
sensitive users γBS . For this plot, we assume that the fee
level is always the optimal value fB/2 +
√
αM · βM/VM .
As expected, larger markets lead to greater security invest-
ments due to the higher stakes in terms of risks. We also
observe that, interestingly, users being more sensitive to fee
levels also results in greater security investments.
7. Volatility and Implications
One of the most interesting features of the cryptocur-
rency exchange business is the phenomenon of huge price
volatility. This effect makes the economic analysis of cryp-
tocurrency exchanges substantively different from traditional
businesses, including traditional currency exchanges. The
high volatility essentially has the effect of placing a large
proportion of the business revenue in the hands of the
changing market.
The extent to which exchanges may adjust their fee
levels is already limited by their placement within an exist-
ing market. But even more generally than that, the factors
that influence fee selection even in more stable exchange
markets do not ordinarily have much to do with the specific
valuations of the traded currencies. That is to say, the choice
Figure 3: Optimal security investment IS as a function of
total market size VM and fraction of fee-sensitive users γBS .
Here, VB = 200M, fB = 0.002, αM = 0.014, βM = 300,
and fS is the optimal fee rate.
of fee level to maximize profit is largely independent of the
currency valuation.
However, the same cannot be said for the value of mak-
ing security investments. The effect on security is absolutely
tied to the value of the assets being exchanged. The pressure
is in two similarly well-motivated dimensions. First, in the
risk dimension, the attention from attackers to the exchange
market is proportional to the value of that market, because
attackers tend to expend the most effort where the money
is. Similarly, in the loss dimension, the exposure of an
exchange is inextricably linked to the market value of its
traded assets. For example, consider an exchange behaving
in exactly the same way under two environmental condi-
tions, one in which the value of a traded asset experiences a
five-fold increase in its market value. In the high-value case,
the loss exposure of the exchange is five times higher; and
this happens without any change of actions by the exchange
with regard to its security or business operation.
Given that security incentives for cryptocurrency ex-
changes should increase roughly in proportion to the value
of the exchanged currencies, it is reasonable to question
whether our security technologies are equipped to scale at
the pace at which many cryptocurrency exchange markets
are moving. Cryptocurrency exchanges over the past year
have experienced business environments in which both their
primary sources of revenue as well as their liabilities for
potential loss of assets have increased and/or decreased more
than ten-fold in the span of much less than a year. This paper
presents a model of distributed security in which horizontal
scaling of distributed exchange architectures can be used to
reduce the exposure of traded volume to would-be hackers.
We are not aware of an existing technology that does this
in real time; but our results suggest that such a technology
would be useful to cryptocurrency exchanges to optimize a
portion of their investment strategies.
8. Conclusions
Cryptocurrency exchanges serve as the major gatekeep-
ers for participation in public blockchain technologies, and
are an important factor for the continued success and future
growth of such technologies. Just as is the case for exchange
markets for traditional currencies, it is imperative that cryp-
tocurrency market participants can have trust in the reliabil-
ity, liquidity, and security of their deposits. Previous research
has shown that these criteria are not always matched as evi-
denced by numerous incidents of cryptocurrency exchanges
closing their doors [27]. Very recent examples of exchange
closures (for a variety of reasons) include Coin.mx and Ya-
cuna, while other exchanges such as Cryptsy are struggling
to stay open. Some exchanges including Bitfinex have also
weathered recent security attacks and managed to continue
business operations with limited long-term impact for their
customers.
Given the importance of cryptocurrency exchanges, it is
prudent to better understand the fundamentals surrounding
exchange risk management. For this purpose, we provided
a discussion of incentives which impact the operations of
an exchange. The observations guided our development of
an economic model to study the trade-off between financial
aspects of running a cryptocurrency exchange and security
investments.
After presenting our model for investigating the daily
profit of a cryptocurrency exchange, we applied this model
to study the day-to-day business incentives of an exchange,
with a specific focus on security investments and the selec-
tion of transaction fees. Our method of assessing the effect
of security investments in terms of distributing loss exposure
appears highly relevant in the context of cryptocurrency
exchanges. We also discussed how implementation of such
security investments might be accomplished in real time
through a horizontal-scaling mechanism that isolates traded
volume into discrete segments.
Our model and analyses do have certain limitations,
which we intend to improve upon in future work. First,
our analyses only consider some of the day-to-day business
decisions which guide the incentives of cryptocurrency ex-
changes. Other major decisions relevant to cryptocurrency
exchanges include a choice of exchange markets, as well
as marketing and advertising strategies. More ambitiously,
to truly capture the full risk dynamic that can result in the
success or demise of an exchange, we would need to employ
a longer-term analysis, that considers liquidity over time. We
believe that our overall framework is suitable for such an
analysis, and that this is something worth pursuing in the
future. Finally, our analysis has focused on the decisions
honest exchanges face when deciding how much effort to
put towards security. We note that many of the highest-
profile exchange failures have uncovered dishonest actions
taken by exchange operators. For example, after Mt. Gox
collapsed, evidence emerged that insiders manipulated the
Bitcoin price by issuing unauthorized trades [15]. Bitconnect
marketed itself as a trading platform and exchange serving a
token valued at $2.7 billion at its peak. However, it suddenly
shut down in January 2018 and was subsequently revealed
to be a Ponzi scheme [31]. The risk that the exchange itself
could be malicious is very real, and one that future models
could take into account.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to attempt modeling the incentives of cryptocurrency ex-
changes for security investments. Our development of a
simplified model and our focus on only some aspects of day-
to-day decisions made by exchanges is justified in part by an
acute observation that there does not exist a single model
for cryptocurrency-exchange security investment strategies
that is simultaneously applicable, analyzable, and efficiently
communicable. As with progress on many other problems
with real world limitations, however, efforts that help us
better understand smaller pieces of complex interactions
may usefully serve as good first steps.
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